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OPINION 
____________ 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
This case calls upon us to construe the preemptive 
scope of the Carmack Amendment, 49 U.S.C. § 14706, and to 
clarify the judicially-created “true conversion” exception.  
We hold that the Carmack Amendment preempts all state law 
claims for compensation for the loss of or damage to goods 
shipped by a ground carrier in interstate commerce.  We also 
conclude that the “true conversion” exception is an exception 
to the liability limiting features of the Carmack Amendment, 
not an exception to its preemptive scope.  We will therefore 
affirm the order of the District Court.  
 
I. 
 
 This case is about missing packages.  First State 
Depository, LLC (“First State”) provides custody, shipping, 
and accounting services for coins and special metals.  When it 
ships coins or special metals, it often does so via a ground 
carrier such as the United Parcel Service of America, Inc. 
(“UPS”), as it did here.  The plaintiffs, First State’s third-
party insurers (the “Underwriters”) invoke their subrogation 
rights and allege that twenty-seven of First State’s shipments 
were lost or stolen by UPS or its employees during an eight-
week period in early 2012.  UPS never located any of the 
missing packages, which were allegedly worth a total of 
$150,000.00.   
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 The Underwriters brought state law claims against 
UPS in the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania for breach of contract, negligence, 
negligent supervision of employees, and “true [and] 
fraudulent conversion.”  Appendix (“App.”) 307-404.  In their 
conversion claim, they alleged that “UPS or its employees, 
agents, technicians, vendors, subcontractors, drivers and/or 
servants” deprived First State of its property and 
“[u]nlawfully took, carried away, concealed, stole or obtained 
[the shipments] by fraud or deception.”  App. 308.  The 
Underwriters premised subject matter jurisdiction solely on 
the complete diversity of the parties; they did not bring any 
claims based upon federal law. 
 
 The District Court dismissed the Underwriters’ 
amended complaint for failure to state a claim upon which 
relief could be granted.  It held that the Carmack Amendment 
preempted all of the Underwriters’ state law claims.  App. 11.  
It recognized that some courts have found “that the Carmack 
Amendment’s liability limitations do not apply when the 
common carrier has committed a true conversion of goods,” 
but held that this exception did not permit an action based on 
state law, but rather abrogated the limitation of liability for 
causes of action brought under the Carmack Amendment 
itself.  App. 11-12.  Because the Underwriters only brought 
state law claims, the District Court held that the exception did 
not save their complaint.  Finally, the District Court noted 
that the Underwriters failed to plead their true and fraudulent 
conversion claim with the particularity demanded by Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b).  App. 14-15.  The Underwriters 
timely appealed. 
 
II. 
The District Court exercised diversity jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.  We have jurisdiction pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
 
Our review of the District Court’s grant of a motion to 
dismiss is plenary.  Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 
203, 206 (3d Cir. 2009).  To survive a motion to dismiss 
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must allege 
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 
face.”  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).  
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A complaint has facial plausibility when there is enough 
factual content “that allows the court to draw the reasonable 
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 
alleged.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).  A 
court must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as 
true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the 
plaintiff.  Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 
(3d Cir. 2008).  We disregard legal conclusions and recitals of 
the elements of a cause of action that are supported only by 
mere conclusory statements.  Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 
629 F.3d 121, 128 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 
III. 
 
 We address two issues in resolving this appeal:  first, 
whether the Carmack Amendment preempts the 
Underwriters’ state law claims; and second, whether the “true 
conversion” exception is an exception to the Carmack 
Amendment’s preemptive scope, or to the Amendment’s 
limitations on carrier liability.   
 
A. 
 
 At common law, a ground carrier’s liability for goods 
damaged in transit varied from jurisdiction to jurisdiction but 
was “virtually unlimited.”  See Emerson Elec. Supply Co. v. 
Estes Express Lines Corp., 451 F.3d 179, 182 (3d Cir. 2006).  
Carriers were subject to “such a diversity of legislative and 
judicial holding that it was practically impossible for a 
shipper . . . to know [its potential liability] without 
considerable investigation and trouble.”  Adams Express Co. 
v Croninger, 226 U.S. 491, 505 (1913) (quotation marks 
omitted).  Carriers could, however, generally limit their 
liability though released value agreements.  See First Pa. 
Bank, N.A. v. E. Airlines, Inc., 731 F.2d 1113, 1116 (3d Cir. 
1984).   
 
 Congress first comprehensively addressed interstate 
carrier liability in the Carmack Amendment to the Hepburn 
Act of 1906.  Pub. L. No. 59-337, 34 Stat. 584.  The 
Amendment adopted much of the common law regime, 
including the ability of carriers to limit their liability by 
agreement in a shipment’s bill of lading.  See Adams Express, 
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226 U.S. at 508-12.
1
  Originally applicable only to interstate 
rail shipments, the Carmack Amendment became applicable 
to motor carriers by the Motor Carrier Act of 1935.  Pub. L. 
No. 74-255, 49 Stat. 543.   
 
 The Carmack Amendment’s operation is relatively 
straightforward.  The general rule is that an interstate carrier 
is strictly liable for damages up to “the actual loss or injury to 
the property caused by (A) the receiving carrier, (B) the 
delivering carrier, or (C) [certain intermediary carriers].”  49 
U.S.C. § 14706(a)(1).  A shipper and carrier can agree to limit 
the carrier’s liability “to a value established by written or 
electronic declaration of the shipper or by written agreement 
between the carrier and shipper if that value would be 
reasonable under the circumstances” in order for the shipper 
to obtain a reduced rate.  Id. § 14706(c)(1)(A).
2
  Shippers 
may bring a federal private cause of action directly under the 
Carmack Amendment against a carrier for damages.  Id. § 
14706(d).  
 
 The Carmack Amendment struck a compromise 
between shippers and carriers.  In exchange for making 
carriers strictly liable for damage to or loss of goods, carriers 
obtained a uniform, nationwide scheme of liability, with 
damages limited to actual loss — or less if the shipper and 
carrier could agree to a lower declared value of the shipment.  
See N.Y., New Haven, & Hartford R.R. v. Nothnagle, 346 
U.S. 128, 131 (1953); accord Wesley S. Chused, The 
Evolution of Motor Carrier Liability Under the Carmack 
Amendment into the 21st Century, 36 Transp. L.J. 177, 210 
(2009).  Making carriers strictly liable relieved a shipper of 
the burden of having to determine which carrier damaged or 
lost its goods (if the shipper’s goods were carried by multiple 
carriers along a route).  It also eliminated the shipper’s 
                                              
1
 Although not directly relevant to this appeal, an excellent 
history of the regulation of liability for interstate ground 
carriers can be found in Emerson Electric Supply, 451 F.3d at 
182-87.   
2
 In order to limit its liability, the carrier must satisfy several 
additional conditions.  See Emerson Elec. Supply, 451 F.3d at 
186 (listing the conditions).  These conditions are not in 
dispute in this appeal. 
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potentially difficult task of proving negligence.  See Sec’y of 
Agric. v. United States, 350 U.S. 162, 173 (1956) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).  In return, carriers could more 
easily predict their potential liability without closely studying 
the tort law of each state through which a shipment might 
pass.  Carriers’ liability was limited to the actual value of the 
goods shipped — punitive damages were not available.  See, 
e.g., Penn. R.R. v. Int’l Coal Mining Co., 230 U.S. 184, 200 
(1913) (noting that “the act provided for compensation, not 
punishment”). 
 
 For over one hundred years, the Supreme Court has 
consistently held that the Carmack Amendment has 
completely occupied the field of interstate shipping.  “Almost 
every detail of the subject is covered so completely that there 
can be no rational doubt but that Congress intended to take 
possession of the subject, and supersede all state regulation 
with reference to it.”  Adams Express, 226 U.S. at 505-06.  
The Court has consistently described the Amendment’s 
preemptive force as exceedingly broad — broad enough to 
embrace “all losses resulting from any failure to discharge a 
carrier’s duty as to any part of the agreed transportation.”  
Ga., Fla. & Ala. Ry. v. Blish Milling Co., 241 U.S. 190, 196 
(1916).  State laws are preempted regardless of whether they 
contradict or supplement Carmack relief.  See Charleston & 
W. Carolina Ry. Co. v. Varnville Furniture Co., 237 U.S. 597, 
604 (1915) (holding that a South Carolina law that imposed a 
$50.00 fine upon carriers that failed to timely report damage 
was preempted by the Amendment).   
 
 The Courts of Appeals have also unanimously held 
that the Carmack Amendment “preempts all state or common 
law remedies available to a shipper against a carrier for loss 
or damage to interstate shipments.”  N. Am. Van Lines, Inc. 
v. Pinkerton Sec. Sys., Inc., 89 F.3d 452, 456 (7th Cir. 1996).  
They have dismissed state and common law claims for breach 
of contract, negligence, conversion and every other action for 
loss of or injury to a shipment of goods.
3
  Courts of Appeals 
                                              
3
 See Tran Enters., LLC v. DHL Express (USA), Inc., 627 
F.3d 1004, 1009 (5th Cir. 2010) (holding that claims for 
breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, and conversion 
were preempted by the Carmack Amendment); Hall v. N. 
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from the First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, 
Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have consistently held 
that the Carmack Amendment is the “exclusive cause of 
action for interstate-shipping contract [and tort] claims 
alleging loss or damage to property.”  Hall v. N. Am. Van 
Lines, Inc., 476 F.3d 683, 688-90 (9th Cir. 2007); accord REI 
Transport, Inc. v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 519 F.3d 
693, 697-98 (7th Cir. 2008).
4
   
                                                                                                     
Am. Van Lines, Inc., 476 F.3d 683, 688-90 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(same regarding negligence, fraud, and conversion claims); 
Smith v. United Parcel Serv., 296 F.3d 1244, 1249 (11th Cir. 
2002) (same regarding fraud, negligence, wantonness or 
willfulness, and outrage claims); Project Hope v. M/V IBN 
SINA, 250 F.3d 67, 73 n.6 (2d Cir. 2001); Gordon v. United 
Van Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 282, 289-90 (7th Cir. 1997) (same 
regarding breach of contract, willful and wanton misconduct, 
Illinois Consumer Fraud Act, fraud in the inducement, and 
fraud in the claims process claims); Rini v. United Van Lines, 
Inc., 104 F.3d 502, 505-07 (1st Cir. 1997) (same regarding 
negligence and misrepresentation claims); Shao v. Link 
Cargo (Taiwan) Ltd., 986 F.2d 700, 705 (4th Cir. 1993) (same 
regarding negligence and breach of contract claims); 
Underwriters at Lloyds of London v. N. Am. Van Lines, 890 
F.2d 1112, 1121 (10th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (same regarding a 
negligence claim); Fulton v. Chi., Rock Island & P. R. Co., 
481 F.2d 326, 331-32 (8th Cir. 1973) (same regarding a 
negligence claim); W. D. Lawson & Co. v. Penn Cent. Co., 
456 F.2d 419, 421 (6th Cir. 1972) (same regarding a breach 
of contract claim). 
4
 Courts of Appeals have identified a peripheral set of state 
and common law causes of action that are not preempted by 
the Carmack Amendment.  See, e.g., UPS Supply Chain 
Solutions, Inc. v. Megatrux Transp., Inc., 750 F.3d 1282, 
1288-95 (11th Cir. 2014) (holding that a claim for attorneys’ 
fees agreed to by contract was not preempted because it does 
not “enlarge or limit the responsibilities of the carrier for loss 
of property,” and “[e]nforcement of a self-imposed 
undertaking poses no risk of patchwork regulation or different 
demands in different jurisdictions”); White v. Mayflower 
Transit, L.L.C., 543 F.3d 581, 585-86 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(holding that claims based on conduct apart from the delay, 
loss, or damage to shipped property would not be preempted); 
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 UPS contends that because First State’s property was 
lost or stolen while it was in transit, all of the common law 
claims that the Underwriters assert are preempted.  We agree.  
We have already held in passing that state law breach of 
contract and negligence claims against a carrier for loss of or 
damage to goods are preempted.  See Lewis v. Atlas Van 
Lines, Inc., 542 F.3d 403, 407-08 (3d Cir. 2008).  We 
reaffirm that holding today.  We also conclude that state law 
conversion claims are likewise preempted, just as the 
Supreme Court itself has instructed.  See Am. Ry. Express 
Co. v. Levee, 263 U.S. 19, 21 (1923).  This is the only result 
that is consistent with the Amendment’s goal of uniformity 
and its “broad, preemptive terms.”  Underwriters at Lloyds of 
London v. N. Am. Van Lines, 890 F.2d 1112, 1116 (10th Cir. 
1989) (en banc). 
 
B. 
 
 Despite the broad preemptive scope of the Carmack 
Amendment, the Underwriters argue that their claim for 
common law conversion should be permitted to proceed on 
account of the “true conversion” exception.  We have held 
that it would be unfair for a carrier to limit its liability when 
the carrier’s actions involve “intentional destruction or 
conduct in the nature of theft.”  Am. Cyanamid Co. v. New 
Penn Motor Express, Inc., 979 F.2d 310, 315-16 (3d Cir. 
1992); accord Tran Enters., LLC v. DHL Express (USA), 
Inc., 627 F.3d 1004, 1009-10 (5th Cir. 2010); Glickfeld v. 
Howard Van Lines, Inc., 213 F.2d 723, 727 (9th Cir. 1954).  
In applying this policy-based exception, courts have exhibited 
some confusion as to what it is an exception to:  the 
preemptive scope of the Carmack Amendment, or the 
Amendment’s liability limiting provisions.  While some 
courts have spoken of the exception as simply “vitiat[ing] 
limits on liability,” see Deiro v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 816 F.2d 
1360, 1366 (9th Cir. 1987), others have noted that an 
                                                                                                     
Gordon, 130 F.3d at 289 (holding that claims based on harms 
apart from the delay, loss, or damage to shipped property are 
not preempted).  The claims that the Underwriters bring do 
not fall within this set.  They seek only to recover for the loss 
of their goods — claims that lie at the heart of Carmack 
preemption. 
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allegation of true conversion
5
 may permit a state law 
conversion action to proceed despite the Carmack 
Amendment.
6
  We hold that the true conversion exception 
does not detract from the Carmack Amendment’s preemptive 
force and is an exception only to its liability limiting 
provisions. 
 
 Viewing the exception as an exception to Carmack 
preemption would be contrary to Supreme Court precedent, 
which explicitly indicates that conversion actions are 
preempted.  In Levee, the plaintiff brought a common law 
trover
7
 suit to recover the full value of an item he had shipped 
from Texas but which never arrived at its destination in 
Louisiana.  263 U.S. at 20.  The shipper attempted to recover 
the item’s full value despite having agreed to limit the 
carrier’s liability in a bill of lading, as permitted under the 
Carmack Amendment.  Id.  The Supreme Court reversed the 
judgment that the plaintiff had obtained in his state court 
trover action.  Id. at 21.  It held: 
 
[T]he limitation of liability was valid, whatever 
may be the law of the State in cases within its 
                                              
5
 In order for a conversion to be a “true conversion,” the 
carrier must have “appropriated the property for its own use 
or gain.”  Glickfeld, 213 F.2d at 727.  The exception does not 
apply “where the conversion is by third parties or even by its 
own employees.”  Id. 
6
 A number of federal district courts and state courts have 
indicated, without much analysis save a perfunctory reference 
to Glickfeld, that true conversion is an exception to Carmack 
preemption.  See Schultz v. Auld, 848 F. Supp. 1497, 1506 
(D. Idaho 1993) (citing Glickfeld for the notion that true 
conversion is an exception to Carmack preemption); Mlinar v. 
United Parcel Serv., Inc., 129 So. 3d 406, 411 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2013) review granted, No. SC14-54, 2014 WL 1800335 
(Fla. Apr. 30, 2014) (noting the same, but declining to 
recognize any exception at all); Dynamic Transit v. Trans 
Pac. Ventures, 291 P.3d 114, 117 (Nev. 2012) (same as 
Schultz); Schwartz v. Atlas Van Lines Inc., 976 P.2d 145, 
151-52 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999) (same as Schultz). 
7
 Trover is another term for conversion.  See Black’s Law 
Dictionary 1739 (10th ed. 2014). 
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control.  The effect of the stipulation could not 
have been escaped by suing in trover and laying 
the failure to deliver as a conversion if that had 
been done.  No more can it be escaped by a 
state law or decision that a failure to deliver 
shall establish a conversion unless explained.  
The law of the United States cannot be evaded 
by the forms of local practice. . . .  The local 
rule applied as to the burden of proof narrowed 
the protection that the defendant had secured, 
and therefore contravened the law. 
  
Id. (citations omitted).  The Supreme Court could not have 
been clearer:  the Carmack Amendment preempts state law 
conversion actions. 
 
 The Levee decision also touches on the other reason 
that this judicially-created exception cannot be an exception 
to Carmack preemption:  so holding would undermine 
Congress’s goal of creating a single uniform, national scheme 
of carrier liability.  Otherwise, carriers would be subject to 
standards of conversion liability (with varying elements, 
burdens of proof, remedies, and defenses) that would differ 
by state.  This result is precisely what Congress sought to 
avoid in enacting the Amendment.  “[I]t is evident that 
Congress intended to adopt a uniform rule and relieve 
[shipping] contracts from the diverse regulation to which they 
had been theretofore subject.”  Adams Express, 226 U.S. at 
506.  Permitting state law conversion actions to proceed every 
time it is alleged that a carrier loses or converts a shipper’s 
goods would swallow the uniform liability scheme that 
Congress created. 
 
 Holding that the true conversion exception vitiates the 
liability limiting provisions of the Carmack Amendment 
furthers the exception’s goals while maintaining the 
Amendment’s uniform liability scheme.  The exception still 
deters a carrier from abusing the liability limiting features of 
the Amendment (that is, inducing a shipper to limit the 
carrier’s liability so that it can steal the shipper’s goods) 
because it still provides a route to full recovery against a 
duplicitous carrier.  All claims that a carrier stole a shipper’s 
goods would remain governed by one nationwide, federal 
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standard and would not “enlarge the responsibility of the 
carrier for loss or at all affect the ground of recovery.”  
Varnville Furniture, 237 U.S. at 603 (quotation marks 
omitted).  We think this is the only way that the true 
conversion exception can exist while remaining faithful to the 
Carmack Amendment’s goals and Supreme Court precedent. 
 
 The true conversion exception has no application to 
this case.  The Underwriters brought only state law claims, 
which are preempted.  They did not bring any claim under the 
Carmack Amendment, nor do they seek remand to add a 
Carmack claim.  Even if UPS did convert their shipments for 
its own use, their only remedy would have been to seek relief 
under the Carmack Amendment and then attempt to vitiate 
the Amendment’s limits on liability by claiming that UPS 
engaged in true conversion.  But the Underwriters, “[a]s 
masters of the complaint . . . chose not to do so.”  Caterpillar 
Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 395 (1987).
8
 
 
IV. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of 
the District Court dismissing the Underwriters’ complaint for 
failure to state a claim. 
 
                                              
8
 Because the Underwriters’ claim for “true and fraudulent 
conversion” is preempted, we need not decide whether the 
plaintiffs needed to plead such claim with particularity in 
accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). 
